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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Allen Brown stands indicted on charges of 
bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and armed bank robbery, 
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).  The District Court granted Brown‘s 
motion to suppress a sample of his DNA, on the ground that it 
had been obtained by way of a materially and recklessly false 
warrant affidavit, in violation of the Fourth Amendment as 
interpreted by Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  The 
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United States appeals.  We have jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 
3731, and will affirm. 
I 
On the morning of October 1, 2007, two men wearing 
distinctive ―Scream‖ masks1 robbed an S&T Bank branch in 
Ford City, Pennsylvania at gunpoint, absconding with more 
than $24,000.  The robbers initially fled the scene on foot, 
running about 150 yards to the Armstrong County School 
District Administration Building.  There they made off with a 
school district van that an employee had left with the engine 
idling.   
Thirty minutes after the robbery, police found the van 
abandoned on Hobson Drive near Route 66, a half-mile from 
the administration building.  Investigators later discovered a 
Scream mask containing DNA material inside the van.  
Witnesses reported seeing a silver Volkswagen Jetta driving 
in the area of Hobson Drive and Route 66 on the morning of 
the robbery.  One witness had seen a silver Jetta parked in the 
area of Hobson Drive and Route 66 around the time of the 
                                                 
1 The mask is named for the 1996 Wes Craven horror film 
that popularized the design; its ghostly appearance recalls Edvard 
Munch‘s painting The Scream.  Such masks are commonly used as 
disguises by robbers and other criminals.  See, e.g., Edecio 
Martinez, “Scream” Mask-Wearing Bandit Attempts Dunkin’ 
Donuts Heist on Long Island (Oct. 12, 2010, 8:14 a.m.), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20019229-
504083.html.   
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robbery.  A different witness had seen a silver Jetta driving 
southbound on Route 66 after the robbery had occurred.  Two 
witnesses described the Jetta as having white license plates; 
one of them specified that the plates were from Maryland. 
One of the bank tellers who had been present during 
the robbery advised Pennsylvania State Trooper Shane Lash 
that she and her co-workers had recognized one of the 
robbers‘ voices as belonging to John Wingate, one of the 
bank‘s regular customers.  A Wingate acquaintance informed 
Lash that Wingate has a nephew who goes by the name 
―Dink‖ or ―Dinky,‖ owns a silver Jetta, and visits Ford City 
frequently.  Another acquaintance stated that he had seen 
―Dink,‖ Wingate, and a third man together at a Ford City gas 
station on the Saturday before the robbery.  ―Dink,‖ Lash 
learned, is Allen Brown‘s nickname. 
When Lash eventually contacted Wingate himself, he 
acknowledged that his nephew lived in Temple Hills, 
Maryland, and had visited in mid-September 2007, but 
insisted that the nephew had not been in Ford City on or 
around October 1.  Lash remained suspicious, and asked FBI 
Special Agent Robert Smith to have his colleagues investigate 
Brown‘s Maryland residence.  Baltimore-based Special Agent 
James Mollica interviewed Brown‘s mother, who stated that 
her son had been visiting Wingate in Ford City at the end of 
September, and confirmed that he owned a silver Jetta.  
Wingate later admitted to Lash that Brown had in fact visited 
him around the date of the robbery.  He further stated that 
Brown had gone out in his Jetta around 8:00 a.m. on October 
1 to buy groceries, and had returned around 10:00 a.m. 
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At this point the investigation was focused on Brown.  
Lash and Smith decided to seek a DNA sample in the hope 
that they could match it to the material found on the Scream 
mask.  This would require a warrant, so Smith requested that 
an Assistant United States Attorney in Pittsburgh assist him in 
preparing an application and affidavit.  Smith had not 
participated in interviewing the witnesses who had seen the 
Jetta, so Lash filled him in via telephone and provided him 
with the written reports that had been generated during the 
investigation.  Smith did not read any of the written witness 
statements, and did not review the investigation reports in any 
detail.  Nevertheless, with the AUSA‘s help, he prepared an 
affidavit in support of a warrant application. 
The affidavit contained only an abbreviated recitation 
of the known facts of the case.  It mentioned the robber‘s use 
of a Scream mask; the stolen van and the mask found inside; 
the fact that Brown had been visiting Ford City around the 
time of the robbery; and Wingate‘s statement that Brown had 
left his home, driving a silver Jetta, at 8:00 and returned at 
10:00.  Finally, Paragraph 7(c) of the affidavit contained the 
following averment:  
Police interviews of various witnesses 
following the robbery reported witnessing the 
stolen Armstrong County School District 
Administration van meet up with a silver 
Volkswagen Jetta having a possible Maryland 
registration.  Witnesses then observed the silver 
Jetta drive away from the area where the van 
was left parked. 
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After the AUSA had finished preparing the affidavit, Smith 
neither checked the affidavit‘s contents against the 
investigation reports nor asked Lash to review its accuracy.  
Smith sent the affidavit off to Mollica, who signed and 
presented it to a federal magistrate judge as being true and 
correct to the best of his knowledge.  The magistrate issued 
the warrant, and after obtaining Brown‘s DNA, investigators 
matched it to the material that they had found on the Scream 
mask. 
 Paragraph 7(c) was false.  At the Franks hearing 
conducted pursuant to Brown‘s suppression motion, Lash 
testified that he never told Smith that ―various witnesses‖ had 
seen the van ―meet up‖ with the Jetta.  Nor was there the sort 
of unbroken chain of observations conveyed by the claim that 
―[w]itnesses then observed the silver Jetta drive away.‖  As 
the District Court wrote in its opinion granting Brown‘s 
motion to suppress, Paragraph 7(c) ―appears to be crafted to 
give the U.S. Magistrate Judge the false impression of a 
continuous sequence of events observed by a number of 
witnesses.‖  United States v. Brown, 647 F. Supp. 2d 503, 511 
(W.D.  Pa.  2009).  The court went on: ―Agent Smith . . . 
incorrectly concluded that non-existent evidence actually 
existed, and, more importantly, took the affirmative step of 
purposely incorporating the non-existent evidence into the 
affidavit.‖  Id. at 513.2  Because the challenged statement had 
                                                 
2 The District Court also found that Smith had recklessly 
omitted various facts from the affidavit.  Because these omissions 




no basis in the evidence, the District Court held that Agent 
Smith had acted with reckless disregard for the truth.  Id.  In 
accordance with Franks, the court proceeded to excise the 
false statement and reassess the affidavit‘s contents: 
Without [Paragraph 7(c)], the affidavit is 
essentially reduced to the following facts: that 
on the morning of the robbery, Defendant left 
the residence of John Wingate ―at around 8 
a.m.‖ in a silver or gray Volkswagen Jetta, and 
returned at ―10 a.m., or thereabout‖ with Perry 
Bell.   
Id.  The absence of any observation of the ―meet-up,‖ the 
court concluded, ―eviscerate[d] probable cause.‖  Id.  
Accordingly, the court held that that evidence obtained 
through the execution of the warrant must be excluded from 
trial.  Id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56).  The 
government timely appealed, requesting that we overturn the 
District Court‘s suppression order. 
II 
 Franks requires suppression of evidence obtained 
pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of a false statement 
that was both material to the finding of probable cause and 
made either knowingly and intentionally or with reckless 
disregard for the truth.3  438 U.S. at 155–56.  The 
                                                 
3 Although Smith did not sign the affidavit himself, and 
was not the source of the information on which the affidavit was 
based, both his conduct and that of the officers working upstream 
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government concedes that Paragraph 7(c) was both false and 
material,4 and Brown likewise concedes that the police did 
not act knowingly and intentionally.  The only question on 
appeal is whether Smith‘s conduct evinces a reckless 
                                                                                                             
from him are relevant to our assessment of whether the affidavit 
was drafted knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard 
for the truth. See United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 276–77 
(3d Cir. 2006) (―[I]t is beyond question that the police cannot 
insulate a deliberate falsehood from a Franks inquiry simply by 
laundering the falsehood through an unwitting affiant who is 
ignorant of the falsehood.‖); United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 
711, 714 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the conduct of officers who 
relayed facts to the affiant was relevant to the Franks inquiry). 
4 If the issue had been raised, we would affirm the District 
Court‘s holding with respect to materiality.  That conclusion is a 
legal one reviewed de novo.  See, e.g., United States v. Awadallah, 
349 F.3d 42, 65 (2d Cir. 2003).  The question is whether, after the 
offending language is removed, the affidavit‘s four corners still 
contain sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause.  
Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d 
Cir. 2000); cf. United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 431 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2002) (―We, of course, must confine ourselves to the facts 
that were before the issuing magistrate—in other words, the 
affidavit.‖).  What little is left after excision is insufficient to 
establish a ―fair probability that . . .  evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place,‖ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 
(1983) (quoting United States v. Jones, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)), 
because it does not connect Brown‘s Jetta to the stolen van, and 
there is nothing else from which the magistrate could have inferred 
that Brown committed the robbery.   
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disregard for the truth.  The District Court‘s articulation of the 
definition of recklessness (What does it mean, in the abstract, 
to act with reckless disregard for the truth?) is a purely legal 
question subject to plenary review.  See United States v. 
Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 275–76 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
application of that standard to the facts of a given case (Did 
the behavior of the officers in this case rise to the level of 
recklessness?) is a mixed question of law and fact, as to 
which this Court has not yet articulated the proper standard of 
review.  We now join the unanimous voice of our sister courts 
of appeals5 in holding that a district court‘s resolution of the 
question whether a particular false statement in a warrant 
affidavit was made with reckless disregard for the truth is 
subject to reversal only upon a finding of clear error. 
                                                 
5 See United States v. Campbell, 603 F.3d 1218, 1228 (10th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Looney, 532 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 709 (6th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 65 (2d Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 
739, 747 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 
662–63 (D.C.  Cir. 1996); id. at 664 (Tatel, J., concurring) (joining 
the panel‘s conclusion ―that the district court did not commit clear 
error in finding that the detective on whose affidavit the search 
warrant was based did not knowingly or recklessly include a false 
statement in his affidavit‖); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 
681–82 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cancela, 812 F.2d 1340, 
1343 (11th Cir. 1987).  Reflecting its limited jurisdiction, the 
Federal Circuit has yet to cite Franks in a majority opinion. 
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In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985), the 
Supreme Court explained that ―in those instances in which 
Congress has not spoken and in which the issue falls 
somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple 
historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a 
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of 
justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to 
decide the issue in question.‖  See also Edwards & Elliott, 
Federal Standards of Review § I.D (West 2007).  De novo 
review is favored where there is a need for appellate courts to 
control and clarify the development of legal principles, and 
where considered, collective judgment is especially 
important.  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 
(1996); Edwards & Elliott, supra, at § I.D.  By contrast, 
issues involving assessments of witness credibility and juror 
bias are wrapped up in evaluations of demeanor that a trial 
judge is in a better position to decide; appeals courts therefore 
defer to district court factfinding in the absence of clear error.  
Miller, 474 U.S. at 114–15.   
 The Ninth Circuit provided a valuable excursus on 
these principles in United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).  The question was whether a district 
court‘s finding that exigent circumstances justified a 
warrantless search was subject to de novo or clear-error 
review.  The court began by setting out the basic framework 
just discussed: factual findings are reviewed only for clear 
error because the trial court is in a ―superior position to 
evaluate and weigh the evidence,‖ and because sound 
allocation of resources favors relieving appellate courts of the 
burden of undertaking ―full-scale independent review and 
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evaluation of the evidence.‖  Id. at 1201 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Conversely, appellate courts are 
freer to consider legal questions carefully because they are 
not required to expend time hearing evidence.  In addition, 
the ―collaborative, deliberative process of appellate courts 
reduces the risk of judicial error on questions of law.‖  Id.  
Furthermore, because stare decisis has the effect of binding 
persons who are not parties to an individual lawsuit, sound 
judicial administration favors the concentration of appellate 
efforts on ensuring correct legal determinations.  Factual 
findings bind only the parties before the court, have little 
effect on the world at large, and accordingly are less in need 
of close appellate review.  Id. 
 The appropriate standard of review for mixed-question 
cases is determined by reference to the underlying principles 
of sound judicial administration: 
If application of the rule of law to the facts 
requires an inquiry that is ―essentially 
factual‖—one that is founded ―on the 
application of the fact-finding tribunal‘s 
experience with the mainsprings of human 
conduct‖—the concerns of judicial 
administration will favor the district court, and 
the district court‘s determination should be 
classified as one of fact reviewable under the 
clearly erroneous standard.  If, on the other 
hand, the question requires us to consider legal 
concepts in the mix of fact and law and to 
exercise judgment about the values that animate 
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legal principles, then the concerns of judicial 
administration will favor the appellate court, 
and the question should be classified as one of 
law and reviewed de novo. 
Id. at 1202 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 
273, 288 (1982); Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 
(1960)).  This calculus will generally favor de novo review, 
―because usually the application of law to fact will require the 
consideration of legal concepts and involve the exercise of 
judgment about the values underlying legal principles.‖  Id.  
As examples, the court cited cases in which de novo review 
applied to trial-court conclusions that the defendant‘s conduct 
had not constituted a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman 
Act, United States v. Gen.  Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 141 
n.16 (1966), and that a transaction did not fall within a 
particular provision of the Internal Revenue Code, Helvering 
v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937).  See 
McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202–03.  Both cases involved the 
construction and application of legislation, and thus required 
the exercise of considered legal judgment.  McConney itself 
likewise concluded that de novo review applies to a 
determination regarding the existence of exigent 
circumstances, because resolution of the question ―requires us 
to consider abstract legal doctrines, to weigh underlying 
policy considerations, and to balance competing legal 
interests‖—a process that ―necessarily involves us in an 
inquiry that goes beyond the historical facts.‖  Id. at 1205. 
 Crucially for our purposes, the en banc Ninth Circuit 
was at pains to point out that there are exceptions to the 
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―general predominance of factors favoring de novo review.‖  
Id. at 1203.  Relevant here is the court‘s explanation that 
some mixed questions involve a ―strictly factual test,‖ such 
that once the test is stated no legal reasoning is necessary to 
the resolution of the issue.  Id.  The considerations related to 
legal correctness and the development of precedent thus carry 
diminished weight.  At the same time, the factual nature of 
the determination favors the trial court‘s experience and first-
hand observation of testimony and other evidence.  The 
primary example of this sort of mixed question put forth by 
the McConney court was state of mind, with specific 
reference to Pullman-Standard‘s discussion of ―actual 
motive‖ under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The 
Pullman-Standard Court distinguished ―actual motive‖ from 
―some legal concept of discriminatory intent,‖ and concluded 
that the former is a ―pure question of fact‖ to be reviewed for 
clear error.  456 U.S. at 289, 290.6   
                                                 
6 The second mixed question identified by the Ninth Circuit 
as being subject to clear error review was whether established facts 
constitute negligence: Because adjudication of negligence requires 
applying ―the data of practical human experience‖ in order to 
determine the meaning of reasonableness under prevailing 
community standards, ―the trial court‘s findings of fact effectively 
determine [the appellate court‘s] legal conclusions.‖  McConney, 
728 F.2d at 1204 (citations omitted).  On this point the court noted 
its disagreement with some other circuits, id. at 1204 n.11 (citing 
Great Atl.  & Pac.  Tea Co.  v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661, 665 (2d 
Cir. 1947)), and indeed it appeared at one time that this Court 
might have been one of those with which the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed.  See Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C. A. Hughes & Co., 
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Applying this functional analysis, our task in this case 
is to ask whether recklessness under Franks is an ―essentially 
factual‖ question about an officer‘s state of mind.  Pullman-
Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.  If so, the principles of judicial 
administration favor deferential review of the District Court‘s 
conclusions.  In this Circuit, the rule is that ―[a]n assertion is 
made with reckless disregard when ‗viewing all the evidence, 
the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the 
accuracy of the information he reported.‘‖  Wilson v. Russo, 
212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  This 
definition provides two distinct ways in which conduct can be 
found reckless: either the affiant actually entertained serious 
doubts; or obvious reasons existed for him to do so, such that 
the finder of fact can infer a subjectively reckless state of 
mind.  Neither prong involves the application of legal 
reasoning or judgment.  The judge is not asked to construe a 
                                                                                                             
669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981) (―An ultimate fact is usually 
expressed in the language of a standard enunciated by case-law 
rule or by statute, e.g., an actor‘s conduct was negligent . . . .‖) 
(citation omitted).  We have now, however, repeatedly reaffirmed 
that ―[a] finding of negligence is, as a general rule, considered a 
finding of fact reviewable by an appellate court under the clearly 
erroneous standard.‖  Travelers Indem.  Co.  v. Ewing, Cole, 
Erdman & Eubank, 711 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Sun Oil 
Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref.Co., 431 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1970); 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2590 (1st ed.  
1971 & Supp. 1983)); En Hui Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 
385 (3d Cir. 2010).  Our jurisprudence on this question falls neatly 
in line with the Ninth Circuit‘s account. 
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statute‘s text or to assess its purpose in order to ascertain 
whether an affiant‘s actions are covered.  The test simply asks 
the court to discern whether ―serious doubts‖ or ―obvious 
reasons‖ existed.  The answer to each of those questions is a 
matter of fact.  Serious doubts exist or they do not; a reason 
for doubt exists or it does not and is obvious or is not.  If 
either question posed in Wilson is answered affirmatively, 
nothing further need be asked before the officer is found 
reckless.  Thus the Franks recklessness determination is an 
―essentially factual‖ inquiry.7 
                                                 
7 Two related observations warrant mention.  First, under 
Franks the more egregiously impermissible state of mind is 
―knowingly and intentionally.‖  438 U.S. at 155.  This Court has 
not developed any technical legal definition of this phrase, which 
is analogous to Pullman-Standard‘s ―actual intent‖ inquiry.  See 
456 U.S. at 289–90.  As in Pullman-Standard, a district court‘s 
conclusion regarding the knowing and intentional character of an 
affiant‘s actions is a factual finding reviewable only for clear error.  
It would be incongruous to treat recklessness differently, given that 
it is just another prong of the same test. 
 Second, in order to obtain a Franks hearing a defendant is 
required to establish his ―allegation of perjury or reckless disregard 
. . . by a preponderance of the evidence.‖  Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.  
Facts, not legal rulings, are determined in accordance with the 
preponderance standard, and once found they are reviewed for 
clear error.  See, e.g., United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (en banc).   
 16 
 
Analysis of the specific considerations underlying the 
Miller-McConney framework confirms this conclusion.  First, 
ascertaining the existence of ―serious doubts‖ is likely to turn 
in substantial part on observations of the demeanor during the 
Franks hearing of (inter alia) the allegedly reckless officer 
himself. The trial judge is better positioned than the judges on 
an appellate panel to evaluate an officer‘s honesty when he 
testifies, ―No, Your Honor, I didn‘t entertain serious doubts 
about the accuracy of that statement I made under oath.‖  
Similarly, what is obvious in a given case will frequently 
depend on background circumstances and facts about the 
community, of which a trial judge is more apt to be aware 
than an appellate panel.  Recklessness determinations are also 
likely to be highly fact-dependent, and thus to carry little 
precedential value: decisions will typically turn on what a 
particular officer did and either knew or should have known.  
Review of such determinations does not warrant substantial 
expenditure of appellate resources, because the answers to the 
questions presented will not be of much use in future cases 
with different fact patterns.  The overarching goals of judicial 
administration thus favor affording deference to the trial 
court‘s findings.   
 One potential objection requires an answer.  In Miller, 
the Supreme Court specifically cited ―proof of actual malice 
in First Amendment libel cases‖ as one instance where ―the 
relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its 
application to the particular circumstances of a case,‖ so that 
de novo review is appropriate.  474 U.S. at 114.  Because the 
courts have derived the Franks recklessness standard from 
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First Amendment actual malice cases,8 one might contend 
that de novo review should apply here as well.   
 The response to this argument begins with the 
observation that ―actual malice‖ is merely a term of art that 
encompasses several different culpable states of mind; the 
inquiry is just as factual in nature as the assessment of ―actual 
motive‖ in Pullman-Standard.  Ticking off the elements 
requires no legal judgment.  The Supreme Court said as much 
in the case that is the ultimate source of Wilson‘s recklessness 
standard: ―The defendant in a defamation action brought by a 
public official cannot, however, automatically insure a 
favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief 
that the statements were true.  The finder of fact must 
determine whether the publication was indeed made in good 
faith.‖  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) 
(emphasis added).  Good faith determinations under the First 
Amendment (and hence under the Fourth) are rendered, in the 
first instance, by the finder of fact.  They are thus, 
necessarily, ―essentially factual‖ in nature. 
                                                 
8 The genealogy is as follows: Wilson cited United States v. 
Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1995); Clapp cited United 
States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 369 (N.D. Ill.  1982), aff’d 
sub nom.  United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1984), 
cert.  denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); and Dorfman cited United 
States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  Davis 
imported into the Fourth Amendment context the Supreme Court‘s 
First Amendment reckless-disregard jurisprudence, as articulated 
in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
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Why, then, is the First Amendment actual malice 
question subject to close appellate scrutiny?  The answer lies 
in its importance to the preservation of an enumerated 
constitutional right.  The Miller Court‘s observation that 
actual malice is subject to de novo review was grounded in a 
citation to Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 
503 (1984).  In Bose, the Court relied heavily on statements in 
case law to the effect that in cases in which constitutional 
values—specifically, First Amendment values—are at stake, 
the appellate courts play a special role in ―mak[ing] sure that 
[the actual malice rule] is correctly applied.‖  Id. at 502.  The 
constitutional nature of the right being protected made the 
difference in the Court‘s decision to review an assessment of 
state of mind—ordinarily a factual issue—de novo.   
But, an objector might respond, although this case 
does not deal with the First Amendment, it does involve the 
Fourth.  Is that not enough?  The answer is ―No,‖ for in fact 
there is no constitutional right at stake here: the exclusionary 
rule is merely a ―judicially created remedy designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its 
deterrent effect.‖  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 
348 (1974).  In contrast, Bose involved the personal right to 
speak freely.  Thus, ―[t]he requirement of independent 
appellate review reiterated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
is a rule of federal constitutional law,‖ adopted as part and 
parcel of the Court‘s protection of both individual acts of 
speech and the entire marketplace of ideas.  Bose, 466 U.S. at 
510–11.  Whereas a libel judgment entered in the absence of 
actual malice works a First Amendment wrong, admission at 
trial of ―fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‗[works] no 
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new Fourth Amendment wrong.‘  The wrong condemned by 
the Amendment is ‗fully accomplished‘ by the unlawful 
search or seizure itself . . . .‖  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 906 (1984) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354).  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ―repeatedly rejected the 
argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a 
Fourth Amendment violation.‖  Herring v. United States, 129 
S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 905–06; Pa. 
Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998); 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1995)).  The presence 
or absence of recklessness has no bearing on the defendant‘s 
constitutional rights, which are violated, if at all, by the 
execution of a warrant obtained through the use of a 
materially false application.  The recklessness inquiry goes 
only to the determination whether a particular violation is of a 
sort that is so in need of deterrence that the exclusionary 
remedy is merited.  See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (―To 
trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be 
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter 
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the 
price paid by the justice system.‖).   
The considerations that led the Bose Court to engage in 
heightened appellate scrutiny do not come into play in a 
Franks recklessness case, because in such a case the court is 
faced only with a garden-variety factual inquiry that does not 
directly affect anyone‘s constitutional rights.9  We therefore 
                                                 
9 To the extent that a Franks case does implicate 
constitutional values, it should be noted that Miller made clear that 
the presence of a constitutional question does not automatically 
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hold that clear-error review applies to the District Court‘s 
finding that Smith acted recklessly. 
III 
  Before assessing whether the District Court‘s 
conclusion was clearly erroneous, we pause to observe that 
Judge McVerry correctly explicated this Circuit‘s 
recklessness standard.  The court properly cited Wilson for 
the proposition that ―[a]ssertions are made with a reckless 
disregard for the truth when, after viewing all of the evidence, 
an officer must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of what was being asserted or had obvious reasons to doubt 
the accuracy of the information which he was asserting.‖  647 
F. Supp. 2d at 512 (citing Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788).  
Recklessness, the court went on, ―is measured by the conduct 
of the investigating officer(s).‖  Id.  The government argues 
                                                                                                             
require that a mixed question be reviewed de novo.  When, for 
instance, ―the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and 
therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are 
compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of 
applying law to fact to the trial court.‖  Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.  
Thus, ―juror bias merits treatment as a ‗factual issue‘ . . . 
notwithstanding the intimate connection between such 
determinations and the constitutional guarantee of an impartial 
jury.‖  Id. at 114–15; Edwards & Elliott, supra, at § I.D.  As we 
have already observed, the recklessness inquiry will frequently 
involve evaluations of demeanor and credibility, which are, like 
the assessment of juror bias, best suited to the competencies of the 
trial court.   
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that the court in fact applied a negligence standard, rather 
than the proper recklessness test, on the basis that its opinion 
―faults Agent Smith, not for including a statement about 
which he ‗must have entertained serious doubts,‘ but for not 
having taken investigatory steps that would have led him to 
the truth.‖  In the government‘s view, the District Court‘s 
statement that ―[t]o have asserted the existence of 
[nonexistent] evidence in the face of readily available access 
to actual evidence to the contrary was a reckless disregard for 
the truth,‖ id. at 513, gives away the game by implying that 
Smith‘s error was his failure to confirm his statement.  After 
all, it is clear that, ―in general, the failure to investigate fully 
is not evidence of an affiant‘s reckless disregard for the 
truth.‖  United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 844 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
 We read the opinion differently.  As we see it, the 
major flaw identified by the District Court is not negligence 
in reviewing the evidence but rather Smith‘s conclusion ―that 
non-existent evidence actually existed, and, more importantly, 
[his decision to take] the affirmative step of purposely 
incorporating the non-existent evidence into the affidavit.‖  
647 F. Supp 2d at 513.  The existence of contradictory 
evidence highlighted the problem with Smith‘s affidavit, but 
(according to the District Court) Smith‘s reckless disregard 
for the truth occurred when he made up Paragraph 7(c) out of 
whole cloth.  Such a fabrication, in the District Court‘s view, 
would justify invocation of the exclusionary rule regardless of 




 We agree with the District Court‘s opinion, so 
understood.  The underlying theory is that, ordinarily, a 
person does not believe something to be true (let alone swear 
in an affidavit that it is ―true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge, information, and belief‖) without an affirmative 
justification.  That justification might come in the form of 
first-hand observation, or from information provided by a 
third party, or from some textual source, but we do not take 
seriously someone who claims that X is true but cannot 
provide any reason for thinking it so.  In other words, a 
reasonable person‘s default position is to doubt that a 
proposition is true until there are grounds to believe it.  The 
absence of sufficient grounding to support an averment 
therefore constitutes an ―obvious reason[] for doubt‖ under 
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788, allowing the court to infer that an 
affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth.  Cf., e.g., 
Beard v. City of Northglenn, 24 F.3d 110, 116 (10th Cir. 
1994) (observing that a ―factfinder may infer reckless 
disregard from circumstances evincing ‗obvious reasons to 
doubt the veracity‘ of the allegations‖) (quoting United States 
v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting St. 
Amant, 390 U.S. at 731)).  The First Amendment case from 
which the reckless disregard standard is drawn makes this 
clear: 
The defendant in a defamation action brought 
by a public official cannot, however, 
automatically insure a favorable verdict by 
testifying that he published with a belief that the 
statements were true.  The finder of fact must 
determine whether the publication was indeed 
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made in good faith.  Professions of good faith 
will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for 
example, where a story is fabricated by the 
defendant, is the product of his imagination, or 
is based wholly on an unverified anonymous 
telephone call.  Nor will they be likely to 
prevail when the publisher‘s allegations are so 
inherently improbable that only a reckless man 
would have put them in circulation.  Likewise, 
recklessness may be found where there are 
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the 
informant or the accuracy of his reports. 
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732 (emphasis added).10  The fact that 
a statement is a fabrication or a figment of a speaker‘s 
                                                 
10 The St. Amant Court delineated several valid bases for 
inferring that a speaker did not act with good faith, of which 
―obvious reasons [for] doubt‖ was but one.  Wilson and other cases 
importing the St. Amant standard into the Fourth Amendment 
context have folded the other bases into the catch-all ―obvious 
reasons,‖ so that fabrication, being a figment of one‘s imagination, 
having been made on the basis of an unverified anonymous tip, and 
inherent improbability should all be understood as subsets of the 
set of possible circumstances that can constitute ―obvious reasons 
to doubt‖ a statement‘s veracity.  Any of these circumstances is 
sufficient to allow an inference that the affiant acted with reckless 
disregard for the truth.   
This reading of the case law is borne out by a perusal of the 
genealogy outlined in note 8, supra.  The language of our test 
(―viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained 
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imagination is sufficient reason for finding that it was not 
made in good faith—i.e., that it was made with (at least) 
reckless disregard for the truth—even if the speaker testifies 
that he believed the statement to be true.  Although the 
District Court did not clearly articulate this epistemological 
conception of recklessness, such a theory lies at the heart of 
its ruling. 
This comports with Herring‘s holding that, ―[t]o 
trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be 
                                                                                                             
serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious 
reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported,‖ 
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788) is taken from Clapp, 46 F.3d at 801 & 
n.6; Clapp quoted Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. at 369; and Dorfman 
cited Davis, 617 F.2d at 694.  Davis compressed the above block-
quotation from St. Amant thusly: 
[T]he Court observed that reckless disregard for the truth 
requires a showing that the defendant ―in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.‖  This 
subjective test may be met not only by showing actual 
deliberation but also by demonstrating that there existed 
―obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or 
the accuracy of his reports.‖ 
617 F.2d at 694 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 732).  The 
D.C. Circuit‘s summary omits the bulk of the paragraph from 
which the ―obvious reasons‖ language is taken.  We understand 
this move as a distillation of the Supreme Court‘s discussion, 
rather than as an effort to eliminate several of the approved 
grounds for inferring recklessness. 
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sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter 
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the 
price paid by the justice system.‖  129 S. Ct. at 702.  The 
invention of baseless averments is plainly the sort of behavior 
that exclusion can be expected to deter: an officer wishing to 
avoid suppression need only look at the evidence before him 
and determine whether it backs up his affidavit, or 
communicate with another officer who has sufficient grounds 
for establishing a belief in the matter in question.  He need 
not waste his time on needlessly duplicative fact-checking; all 
that is required is that his belief in the facts to which he 
swears have a sufficient grounding.  This is also a brand of 
behavior worth deterring: the idea of a police officer 
fabricating facts or even entire affidavits in order to obtain 
probable cause is quite obviously repugnant to the Fourth 
Amendment.  To hold that an officer cannot be found reckless 
unless he actually possesses information contradicting his 
averment would be to grant license to do just that.  Police 
should be expected to collect and review evidence before 
seeking a warrant to invade a citizen‘s home and person, and 
should not be permitted to rely on unsubstantiated hunches.  
Accordingly, we hold that a court may properly infer that an 
affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth where his 
affidavit contains an averment that was without sufficient 
basis at the time he drafted it. 
IV 
As our dissenting colleague emphasizes, Smith 
―believed that the information in the affidavit was accurate at 
the time he drafted it,‖ and thus did not knowingly make his 
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false statement.  But that is not the end of the Franks test.11  
The question here is whether Smith‘s statement was made 
with reckless disregard for the truth, or whether he acted only 
negligently.  For we are mindful that, ―[u]nder Franks, 
negligent police miscommunications in the course of 
acquiring a warrant do not provide a basis to rescind a 
warrant and render a search or arrest invalid.‖  Herring, 129 
S. Ct. at 703.  Had Smith merely negligently misheard Lash, 
or had Lash negligently misspoken, Herring would control.  
Because an affidavit that is only negligently false is not 
subject to excision under Franks, evidence collected under 
the auspices of a warrant supported by such an affidavit 
would not be subject to suppression. 
In the case now before us, the District Court was on sound 
footing when it concluded that Smith‘s false assertion was not 
a result of merely negligent miscommunication.  Smith did 
not claim that Lash specifically told him that witnesses saw 
the two vehicles meet up, and Lash testified that he did not 
tell Smith that he saw the vehicles meet.  Smith‘s false 
averment had no basis in any of the materials with which he 
had been presented.  He had no reason to believe that the 
                                                 
11 For this reason, our colleague‘s observation, that ―[i]t is 
actually implausible to surmise that [Smith] would have acted in 
such an unreasonable and even surprising manner given that the 
correct facts would have been more than sufficient to establish 
probable cause,‖ is a red herring.  The question before us is not 
knowledge or intent, to which motive or lack thereof would be 
relevant, but whether Smith entertained serious doubts or had 
obvious reasons to do so. 
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statement in question was true.  At the suppression hearing, 
he was unable to come up with any explanation of the origin 
of the false claim that multiple witnesses had observed the 
Jetta meeting up with the getaway van and then driving away.  
He essentially acknowledged that he had conjured Paragraph 
7(c) out of thin air.  Contra the dissent‘s assertion, Smith did 
not merely fail to corroborate his averment; he failed ever to 
develop any basis for it in the first place.  Because the total 
lack of an evidentiary basis for making an averment can 
constitute an obvious reason for doubting that averment‘s 
veracity, the District Court did not clearly err in finding that 
Smith‘s conduct rose beyond the level of negligence, to the 
point of recklessness.  We will affirm the suppression order. 
1United States v. Brown,  No. 09-3643, dissenting.
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Because the record does not support the District
Court’s determination that Smith acted with reckless
disregard for the truth when he incorporated paragraph 7(c)
into the warrant affidavit, I respectfully dissent.   
As the majority correctly notes, we have previously
explained that “[a]n assertion is made with reckless disregard
when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or
had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information
he reported.”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The
majority also properly characterizes the recklessness inquiry
as a subjective test, with the ultimate focus remaining on
whether a finder of fact can either directly find or “infer a
subjectively reckless state of mind.”  (Maj. Op. at 11.)  “In
applying the reckless disregard test to assertions, we have
borrowed from the free speech arena and equated reckless
disregard for the truth with a ‘high degree of awareness of the
statements’ probable falsity.’”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788
(citation omitted).  
The majority concludes that the District Court’s
recklessness determination was proper because, in its view,
the record supports the District Court’s finding that Smith
“made up Paragraph 7(c) out of whole cloth.”  (Maj. Op. at
17.)  According to the majority, “[t]he fact that a statement is
a fabrication or a figment of a speaker’s imagination is
sufficient reason for finding that it was not made in good
2faith—i.e., that it was made with (at least) reckless disregard
for the truth—even if the speaker testifies that he believed the
statement to be true.”  (Id. at 18-19.)  While this statement of
law is not incorrect in the abstract, the District Court in this
case never specifically found that Smith had “fabricated” the
disputed evidence or cut it “out of whole cloth.”
The District Court’s decision holds that Smith acted
with reckless disregard for the truth because he failed to take
any steps to verify his understanding of the evidence, which
was based solely on his telephone conversations with Lash; in
the District Court’s view, for Smith “[t]o have asserted the
existence of [non-existent] evidence in the face of readily
available access to actual evidence to the contrary was a
reckless disregard for the truth.”  United States v. Brown, 647
F. Supp. 2d 503, 513 (W.D. Pa. 2009).  But as even the
majority acknowledges, suppression is not warranted when an
officer negligently includes a false assertion in a warrant
affidavit, and the failure to conduct a full investigation does
not constitute evidence of recklessness.  See, e.g., Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (“[A]llegations of
negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient” to warrant
suppression); see also Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
695, 703 (2009) (“Under Franks, negligent police
miscommunications in the course of acquiring a warrant do
not provide a basis to rescind a warrant and render a search or
arrest invalid.”); United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054,
1058-59 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that misstatement in warrant
affidavit was not made with reckless disregard for the truth
because it was highly probable that there was a
miscommunication between the investigating officer and the
officer who drafted the affidavit); United States v. Dale, 991
F.2d 819, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[I]n general, the failure to
3investigate fully is not evidence of an affiant’s reckless
disregard for the truth.”).
Returning to the majority’s “fabrication” theory, such a
characterization has no real basis in the record (and, to the
extent the District Court’s decision could be construed as
making any “fabrication” finding, such a finding would be
clearly erroneous at least in the absence of any adverse
credibility determination against Smith himself).  For
instance, although Smith ultimately acknowledged at the
hearing that “Trooper Lash never told [him] that the Jetta met
up with the school van,” (App. 241), he also repeatedly
testified that he had previously believed that the information
in the affidavit was accurate at the time he drafted it.  More
significantly, he indicated that (in the words of the District
Court itself) “[h]e based his statements in the affidavit on
discussions which he had previously had with Trooper Lash.”
647 F. Supp. 2d at 508.  The District Court never specifically
made a credibility finding against Smith or otherwise rejected
any of his sworn testimony. 
Accordingly, it is incorrect to assert that Smith had no
basis or reason whatsoever for believing that the information
included in the affidavit was true at the time the affidavit was
drafted.  He relied at that point in time on what he had
remembered (and perhaps had inferred) from his prior
conversations with Lash.  As it turns out, he was wrong and
acted negligently when he should have read the reports of
Lash.  However, Smith clearly did not irrationally “believe
something to be true (let alone swear in an affidavit that it is
‘true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information,
and belief’) without an affirmative justification.”  (Maj. Op. at
17.)  It is actually implausible to surmise that he would have
  I make this point in the limited context of assessing Smith’s1
state of mind at the time the affidavit was drafted.  
4
acted in such an unreasonable and even surprising manner
given that the correct facts would have been more than
sufficient to establish probable cause.   See Illinois v. Gates,1
462 U.S. 213, 236-37 (1983) (explaining that “so long as the
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth
Amendment requires no more”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).  In particular, several witnesses saw a silver
car parked where the van was later discovered, and one of
those witnesses—who specifically identified the car as a
Volkswagen Jetta—saw it again at 9:25 a.m. traveling away
from the vicinity of the parked van.                
I would reverse the order of the District Court and,
accordingly, respectfully dissent.  
